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RECENT DECISIONS

CONTRACTS - DONEE BENEFICIARY - CONSIDERATION FROM
PROMISEE.-The defendant was surety and the Keresy Ryan Corporation principal, upon a bond running to Sears Roebuck & Company. The principal had undertaken to construct a building for
Sears Roebuck. The latter exacted a bond which guaranteed the
faithful performance of the building contract and the discharge of
any debts or obligations owing from the Keresy Corporation to
laborers and materialmen. In a suit to recover for materials, plaintiff's motion to strike out defendant's defenses of lack of privity and
absence of consideration between the promisee, Sears Roebuck Corporation and the plaintiff beneficiary was granted. On appeal, held,
privity of contract and consideration from a promisee to a beneficiary is not essential to recovery by the latter on a gratuitous promise
where the clear intent of the contract is to benefit a third party.
Graybar Electric Co., Inc. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 157 Misc. 275,
283 N. Y. Supp. 522 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1935).
In New York the subject of the application of the doctrine of
beneficiary contracts is expressed in Seaver v. Ransom' to extend
to four classes: (1) where there is a legal obligation running from
the promisee to the beneficiary; 2 (2) where the contract is made
for the benefit of the near relative of a party to the contract; 3
(3) the public contract cases where the municipality seeks to protect its inhabitants by covenants for their benefit; 4 (4) where, at
the request of a party to the contract, the promise runs directly to
the beneficiary although he does not furnish the consideration. 5 In
the instant case 6 the court makes a strained effort to bring the facts
within the fourth class enumerated. But the difficulty is that no
direct promise to the beneficiary is present. The court, however,
also relied on the doctrine of the donee beneficiary enunciated in
the Restatement of the Law of Contracts wherein a gift promise 7
is made enforceable by the beneficiary when there is a clear inten1

Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 619 (1918).
' Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (1859) (debtor-creditor beneficiary);
Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280 (1877).
'Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181 (1884); Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y.
109, 52 N. E. 724 (1899); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 619
(1918).
'Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330, 76 N. E. 211 (1906).
'F. N. Bank of Sing Sing v. Chalmers, 144 N. Y. 432, 39 N. E. 331
(1895); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 127 App. Div. 871, 112 N. Y. Supp. 10 (4th
Dept. 1908).
'Graybar Electric Co. v. Seaboard Surety Co., 157 Misc. 275, 279, 283 N.
Y. Supp. 522, 524 (1935).
"RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§133. A gift promise is one where
"it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part
of the performance thereof is t6 make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer
upon him a right against the promisor to some performance neither due nor
supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the beneficiary."
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tion to benefit him.8 The furthest that the Court of Appeals has
gone in sustaining the donee beneficiary is the close relationship
cases 9 where no consideration other than a moral obligation is required between the beneficiary and promisee. In a recent case,
McClare v. Mass. Bonding and Insurance Co. 10 the principal opinion
pronounced strong dicta to the effect that a donee beneficiary has
enforceable rights in New York. A strong dissenting opinion did
not disapprove this dicta, it simply maintained that the promisee bad
no legal capacity to contract with the promisor and that the beneficiary could therefore not recover." Seaver v. Ransom does not
limit beneficiary contracts to four classes. The progressive view on
the subject is that any beneficiary clearly designated and intended to
be benefited upon a contract has enforceable rights therein. 12 This
seems to be the attitude of our highest court 13 and will probably
be so declared when the situation is presented.
I. J. B.

CONTRACTS-PERFORMANCE

TO

SATISFACTION-OVERHEAD.-

Defendant undertook to purchase stationery from plaintiff, the purchase price to be the cost of production plus a stipulated percentage
of profit. The contract further provided that the overhead charges
to be included in the cost of production, were to be satisfactory to
the purchaser. As a matter of fact, the overhead charges were not
satisfactory to the purchaser, and it refused to accept the stationery.
The seller brings this action for breach of contract, claiming that
the defendant should be satisfied with such an allowance of overhead
'RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 135, illustration 4 is precisely the
situation here:
"D contracts to build a house for A. A obtains a bond from B. B
promises A that all D's creditors for labor and materials who may acquire
a lien on the house shall be paid. C is such a creditor of D's. C is a
donee beneficiary."
'Todd v. Weber, 96 N. Y. 181 (1884) ; Buchanan v. Tilden, 158 N. Y. 109,
52 N. E. 724 (1899); Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 619 (1918);
cf. Vogeler v. Alwyn Construction Corp., 247 N. Y. 131, 159 N. E. 886 (1928),
discussed in Note (1928) 18 CORN. L. Q. 621.
" McClare v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 371, 195 N. E. 17
(1935).
' McClare v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 371, 380, 195 N. E.
17, 18 (1935). There must be an enforceable contract between the promisor
and promisee before a beneficiary whose rights are derivative, can sue.
' I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920)
CIAL

PROCESS (1922)

Bonds (1928)

§ 368; CARDOZO, NATURE OF

THE JUDI-

99; Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractor's

38 YALE L. J. 1.

" Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233, 120 N. E. 169 (1918) ; Ultramares v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 180, 174 N. E. 441, 445 (1931); McClare v. Mass.
Bonding and Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 371, 379, 195 N. E. 17 (1935).

